The Punic wars were a sequence of military conflicts fought between the Roman Republic and Carthaginian Empire taking place from 264 BCE to 146 BCE. At the outset of the wars Rome was not the power we think of, it had only just achieved dominance of the Italian peninsula; Carthage, in contrast, was the dominant authority in the Western Mediterranean, her influence spread from Libya, to the coasts of Iberia. Rome in this sense, was initially the underdog. These wars were of such geopolitical importance that the victor would go on to establish a pan-Mediterranean hegemony that would last the next half millennium. Across the 118-year period in which these wars occurred, there were forty-three years of direct conflict, and an estimated 1.5 million killed; making it, not only one of the longest wars fought by Rome, but also one of its bloodiest.

Hannibal's next move is well known; in one of history’s most preposterous military manoeuvres, he marched his men across the Alps. Over the fifteen-day slog, Hannibal lost over half his army, mostly through desertion and exposure. He emerged with little over 20,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry and a single elephant of the original 37; nonetheless, he had not only succeeded in eluding the now dominant Roman navy, but had circumnavigated Rome’s legions. Planting himself at the open doorway of the Italian Peninsula, Hannibal prepared to face off against the leviathan that was the Roman army.

What followed, was the complete devastation of Roman manpower and confidence. Over a fifteen-year period Hannibal rampaged across the Italian Peninsula, eradicating army after army sent to end his terror. The crushing defeats inflicted by Hannibal include battles such as: Trebia (218 BCE), Trasimene (217 BCE) and Cannae (216 BCE), the latter resulting in the death of up to 50,000 Roman soldiers in a single day. If ancient sources are to be trusted, Rome may have lost as many as 300,000 men throughout this period, or, in other words, one-sixth of the adult male population. Perhaps more startling, the revelation that the majority of these casualties occurred within the first three years of Hannibal’s Italian campaign. Never again would Rome undergo such desolation in so dense a period.

In spite of these horrific losses, Rome persevered, and eventually went on to attack the ‘soft under-belly’ of the Carthaginian Empire, first in Spain and then in Africa. Led by a young general who had survived the horrors of Cannae, the Roman army reinvented itself. Utilising the tactics previously employed by Hannibal, the young Scipio understood that cavalry superiority was essential, a deal with the Numidian King Massinissa, provided Rome with access to the famous Numidian cavalry previously used by Hannibal. Scipio travelled to Iberia and inflicted staggering defeats on Carthaginian forces led by Hannibal’s brothers. Following this, a successful push into Africa forced Hannibal’s withdrawal from Italy and led to the final showdown of the war, the decisive battle of Zama.

The battle of Zama saw Carthage defeated for the final time in the Second Punic War. It is where Scipio and Hannibal finally met in battle, the two greatest general in one final showdown. Unusually, the Roman army found itself with cavalry superiority whilst the Carthaginian army had the better infantry. Hannibal began by ordering his elephants forward, hoping to disrupt the Roman frontline and exploit breaches created by the elephants. Scipio, expecting this, ordered his soldiers to blast their trumpets, startling the elephants into a rout; those that made it to the Roman lines were effectively funnelled between the maniples of the army and killed. With the prelude over, the two armies engaged, fighting to a stalemate. This lasted until the dominant Roman cavalry managed to encircle the Carthaginian main line. This spelled doom for Hannibal's forces, as many as 20,000 were killed and 20,000 captured, Hannibal was one of the few Carthaginians to escape the battle. This marked the end of the Second Punic War. Carthage would never again be able to challenge Rome.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Romano-Punic rivalry is how different the two factions were. First, Carthage, a trading behemoth and the dominant maritime power of the Western Mediterranean. The city state had been founded by Phoenicians, and her Empire had grown rich through the naval traditions instilled by her founders. At the outset of the wars, the Carthaginian navy was the dominant maritime force in the Western Mediterranean; her land forces were less efficient. The wealth accumulated by the Empire, and its distrust of a regular standing army, entrenched a reliance on mercenary troops, paid to battle on her behalf; Libyans, Numidians, Gauls, Iberians and the rest would happily fight for Carthaginian gold. True Carthaginian citizens only served in her army if there was a direct threat to the Empire’s capital. Unlike her army, Carthage’s navy was constantly manned, usually by her citizens. With the dawn of the Second War, Carthage found her navy weak and unable to match the now dominant Roman fleet. In spite of this Carthage possessed two advantages: a tactically flexible mercenary army, and an individual under the name Hannibal Barca. As history would prove, this frightful combination was more than a match for the legions of Rome. 

In contrast the Roman Republic was an agricultural power, which relied on the power of its land forces to achieve victory. The Republican army of this period did not maintain standing or professional military forces, but levied them, by compulsory conscription of her citizens. The majority would serve as infantry, a small minority of wealthier citizens would go on to form the cavalry (equites). Nonetheless, Rome’s strength was her infantry, when assembled they would fight as four different unit types. First the skirmishers, known as the Velites, these were often the young or the poor, whom could not afford armour and instead acted as a screen to the main army that would launch javelins at an approaching enemy. Then came the frontline, these were known as the Hastati, young men, armed with pilum, a gladius and armour; these men, like the velites, tended to comprise of the young and the poor. The next two lines comprised of the Principes then Triarii. These would have been the older, wealthier citizens. Armed with gladius, thrusting spear and heavy armour, these men provided the steady backbone of a Roman fighting force. The Roman army would fight in a manipular formation three lines deep (triplex acies) behind a velite screen. This system offered greater tactical strength and flexibilty, allowing individual maniples to be mutually aid one another, however it was prone to being outmanoeuvred and struggled to respond to threats on its flanks; as demonstrated by Hannibal at Cannae.